The Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats are often portrayed as BritainÕs proEuropean parties. Indeed, both parties express a keen interest in keeping Britain in the European Union (EU) and in promoting a constructive engagement with other member states. Yet, to what extent can the two parties be characterized as Europhiles? In this article, we develop Taggart and SzczerbiakÕs (2008) concept of hard and soft Euroscepticism, extend it to Europhile party positions, and apply it to Labour and the Liberal DemocratsÕ recent European policies. For this purpose, we analyze manifestos and party leadersÕ key speeches on the EU. We find, overall, that the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats are ÔsoftÕ Europhiles whose discourses have focused on EU reform. Yet, whilst their EU policies are very similar, their EU strategies differ: the Labour leadership have generally tried to contain the salience of EU issues, whereas the Liberal Democrats have followed a more offensive EU strategy after 2014. This can best be explained through electoral incentives and internal dynamics.
Introduction
BritainÕs ÔawkwardÕ relationship with the European Union (EU) is a topic that fills library shelves. Since Britain joined the European Union in 1973, the two main parties, the Labour Party and the Conservative Party, have been critical of BritainÕs EU membership at various times (Geddes, 2013; George, 1998) . In the 1970s and early 1980s, the Labour Party was deeply divided over BritainÕs EU membership (Daniels, 1998) . In the past two decades, large sections of the Conservative Party have called for BritainÕs exit from the EU (Lynch, 2015; Bale, 2006) . This situation In very few other member states has EU membership been as controversial amongst mainstream parties as in the UK. What is more, the recent successes of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which calls for EU withdrawal and has won a considerable number of seats in local and European elections, as well as one seat in the general election of 2015, has contributed to a EU-hostile environment (Abbarno and Zapryanova, 2013) . By contrast, the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats are often portrayed as BritainÕs ÔEurophilesÕ. For instance, the Economist referred to LabourÕs leader Ed MilibandÕs Ôproud EurophiliaÕ (15/03/2014) and to the Liberal Democrats as an Ôearnestly pro-EuropeanÕ party (01/03/2014). What is more, the Liberal Democrats often stress their Ôproud track record as the most consistently proEuropean party in British politicsÕ (see for instance: Liberal Democrats, 2013) . In this article, we investigate these claims. We compare the recent European policies of the Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats in order to establish their degree of Europhilia.
Much has been written about New LabourÕs EU policy record (Daddow, 2015; Daddow, 2011; Bulmer, 2008; Forster, 2002) . It is often argued that under the leadership of Tony Blair (1994 Blair ( -2007 , the Labour Party took a particularly proEuropean approach (Heffernan 2001 ). Yet, BlairÕs former EU adviser, Roger Liddle (2014) argues that the Labour leadership lacked a EU strategy when it took office in 1997 and, due to their lack of experience in government, missed the opportunity for Britain to join the Euro. Thus, despite high aspirations, BlairÕs EU policy record in office has been described as Ôat best mixedÕ (Smith, 2005) . Schnapper (2015) compares the EU policies of Gordon Brown and Ed Miliband, with (Russell and Fieldhouse, 2005) . More recent studies have assessed the role of the EU in the Liberal DemocratsÕ coalition with the Conservative Party in 2010. For instance, Goes (2013: 15) argues that the Conservatives were the drivers of the CoalitionÕs EU policy, whilst the Liberal Democrats acted as navigators ensuring, most of the time, that the agreed roadmap was respected. Oppermann and Brummer (2014: 566) , by contrast, argue that the Liberal Democrats initially succeeded in constraining the ConservativesÕ ÔEurosceptic aspirationsÕ, but that their influence waned over the years.
The European policies of Labour and the Liberal Democrats have thus been studied separately. In this article, we compare the two partiesÕ EU policies to address this gap in existing research. Our analysis starts in 2007, when new party leaders came into power, and ends in 2015, when these leaders stepped down. We thus focus our attention on the EU policy developments under Gordon Brown and Ed MilibandÕs leaderships of the Labour Party and Nick CleggÕs leadership of the Liberal Democrats.
We begin the article by investigating Taggart and SzczerbiakÕs (2008) framework of Eurocepticism and by extending it to include Europhilia. Next, we compare the positions of Labour and the Liberal Democrats on EU politics, the EU polity, and EU policies. We do this by investigating the three main themes we identified in manifestos and leadersÕ EU speeches: BritainÕs relationship with the EU; the EUÕs institutional design; and, EU economic and monetary policy. We find that in all three areas, the parties have more in common than sets them apart; both want Britain to stay in the EU, but focus their attention on the EUÕs need to reform. We then explain why the two parties are ÔsoftÕ Europhiles, focusing on the EU-hostile political environment, their status as parties in government or opposition, and intra-party divisions. In the conclusion we discuss the implications of our findings for comparative research into Euroscepticism. We argue that while Labour and the Liberal Democrats are often portrayed as Europhiles, placing this in a European context highlights the limits to their support for European integration.
Eurosceptics or Europhiles? Political parties and their European policies
! In the past two decades there has been a growth in comparative research into the phenomenon of Euroscepticism. The literature on party-based Euroscepticism draws heavily on the work of Paul Taggart (1998: 366) who defined Euroscepticism as Ôthe idea of contingent, or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integrationÕ. More recently, Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak (2008: 247-248) have refined the concept and now distinguish between ÔhardÕ and ÔsoftÕ Euroscepticism. Hard Euroscepticism can be understood as Ôprincipled opposition to the project of European integration as embodied in the EU, in other words, based on the transfer of powers to supranational institutions such as the EUÕ. In contrast, soft Euroscepticism applies to situations Ôwhen there is no principled objection to the European integration project of transferring powers to a supranational body such as the EU, but there is opposition to the EUÕs current or future planned trajectory based on the further extension of competencies that the EU is planning to makeÕ. ÔSoftÕ Euroscepticism, in particular, has been criticized for being defined Ôin such a broad manner that virtually every disagreement with any policy decision of the EU can be included (Kopeck! and Mudde, 2002: 300) .
In response to the criticism, Taggart and Szczerbiak (2008) have specified what Euroscepticism is not, arguing that a party criticizing the EU for failing to properly reflect its countryÕs national interests in, for example, EU budget or EU accession negotiations, cannot be described as Eurosceptic. Furthermore, according to the authors, Euroscepticism does not apply to a party that is broadly in favour of European integration but opposes one or two EU policy areas. They add that this depends on the Ôquality of these policy areas being opposed rather than the quantityÕ (Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008: 250) . For instance, they specify that a party opposing a core policy area such as the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is more likely to be categorized as Eurosceptic than a party opposing a peripheral EU policy area. Our analysis draws on two main sources: party manifestos and leader speeches.
Manifestos are authoritative policy statements that have been approved by the party organization in a democratic process. Therefore, manifestos are often used to map take action (except in the areas that fall within its exclusive competence), unless it is more effective than action taken at national, regional or local level (Europa.eu, Glossary, n.d.g.) .
partiesÕ policy preferences (Volkens et al., 2013) . Second, party leadersÕ speeches on the EU provide a snapshot of current themes and debates, and are therefore a useful addition to manifestos. Third, we have also drawn on a newspaper article written by Nick Clegg, and on a EU policy document published by the Liberal Democrats, as these two documents provide additional details about the partyÕs EU policy. Table 2 below lists the documents we used for our analysis. (Liddle, 2014: 89) . This reformist line of argument has continued over recent years. In each manifesto, Labour called for EU institutional reform. The 2014 European manifesto was the first to contain a separate chapter entitled Ôreform and value for moneyÕ in which the party argued: ÔEuropean institutions must be reformed to be more effective and better suited to meet the needs of its Member States, including the UK. Labour has a robust European reform agenda which seeks to achieve thisÕ (Labour Party, 2014: 24) .
Despite this rhetoric, LabourÕs EU institutional reform plans remained vague. The key reform project was a Ôred card systemÕ, which would allow national parliaments to express concern with a piece of EU legislation and force the EU to either abandon or amend it (Miliband, 12/03/2014) . Moreover, there were some suggestions as to making the workings of the European Parliament and Commission Ômore streamlined and effectiveÕ, e.g. through decreasing the number of Commissioners and portfolios.
Labour also aimed to abolish the Strasbourg seat of the European Parliament, describing it as ÔwastefulÕ in the 2014 European manifesto; a view that was shared by the Liberal Democrats. Hence, despite the vague plans, Labour has taken a soft Europhile, reformist stance on the EUÕs institutional design.
As for Labour leaders, it is rare for Liberal Democrat politicians to speak about the EU polity without first stressing reform. However, the reform plans were more detailed and give the impression of a party that put more thought into its EU agenda than Labour. The need for EU institutional reform was highlighted in all manifestos.
Moreover, Nick Clegg referred to EU institutional reform in all of his EU speeches.
This trend was not new. Already in 2004, when the Liberal DemocratsÕ ÔOrange BookÕ was published in an attempt to re-orientate the partyÕs policies, Nick Clegg argued in his chapter that the EU should gain public confidence by ending the perpetual institutional changes and by focusing on major issues, such as climate change and building economic prosperity. At the same time, however, he remained committed to a host of EU institutional reforms, and emphasised the EUÕs need for decentralisation (Clegg, 2004) .
The Liberal Democrats shared LabourÕs position on the importance of national parliaments, arguing that they should be given more powers to shape EU policy (Clegg, 2013 
The EUÕs economic and monetary policies
Under BlairÕs leadership, Labour was principally in favour of joining the Euro.
However, the Labour PartyÕs 1997 manifestoÕs section on the Euro was Ôa piece of studied ambiguity to see Labour through an electionÕ (Liddle, 2014: 74) and Blair was soon after the election under pressure to announce a Euro-strategy. Under Chancellor Brown, the Ô5 testsÕ -a Treasury-led economic assessment Ð had to be met if Britain was to join the single currency, and the public had to be consulted in a referendum. (Miliband, 19/11/2012) .
In their 2015 general election manifesto, Labour further clarified their position on the Euro by stating that: Ôwe will not join the Euro, and we will ensure EU rules protect the interests of non-Euro members.Õ It is thus interesting to note that Labour has not only abandoned plans for Euro membership, but that, despite the salience of the Eurozone crisis, the party barely mentioned the topic in its manifestos and speeches. The EU budget is in urgent need of wholesale reform so that money is spent only on the things the EU really needs to do. (É) We do not see the need, in the current context, for any significant growth in the budgetÕs size, nor the abolition of the British rebate (Liberal Democrats, 2009: 17 ).
Yet, the tone of the 2009 manifesto was generally positive, as the Liberal Democratsin contrast to Labour -also mentioned successful projects that were funded by the EU.
It is thus interesting to note that five years later, the Liberal Democrats followed suit and stressed the need for restraint:
At a time of austerity across Europe, Liberal Democrats helped push through the first ever reduction in the European Union budget by £30 billion. We want to build on the savings already achieved and push for further reductions in European Union administrative costs including through cuts to travel and transport budgets (Liberal Democrats, 2014: 32) .
The ÔtoughÕ stance on the EU budget was also highlighted in Nick CleggÕs speeches.
Most notably, in his speech to Chatham House, Clegg (01/11/2011) stressed: Ôwe will not accept an increase, above inflation, to the EU Budget. That is a real terms freeze.
And we will protect the British rebate in full. That is the toughest position of any European country. At time of tough choices at home, this not only means restraint in the EU budget but also reform. The budget should focus on those items where spending at an EU level can save money at the national level, and resources should be shifted from areas such as the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and put into areas of more productive economic development, such as research and development for new technologies (Labour Party, 2014: 6) .
Furthermore, in all of his three key speeches on the EU, Ed Miliband referred to EU budget reform, and in two of them, this included CAP reform. Yet, again, the reform plans remained very vague.
The Liberal Democrats also mentioned CAP reform in all manifestos and EU
speeches. Yet, in contrast to Labour, they offered a more detailed reform plan. For Overall, however, Labour and the Liberal Democrats can hardly be labelled hard Europhiles, as they constantly stressed the deficiencies of the EU. What is more, on
BritainÕs membership of the Euro, they took a soft Eurosceptic stance. Table 5 below provides an overview of LabourÕs and the Liberal DemocratsÕ positions on EU politics, the polity, and policies. The question is whether the two partiesÕ focus on EU reform has become more pronounced in recent years. Our own coding of LabourÕs and the Liberal DemocratsÕ general election manifestos since 1997 shows that the two parties have been relatively consistent in their emphasis on EU reform. Importantly, however, data from the Manifesto Research Group (Volkens et al., 2013) indicates that the parties have placed declining emphasis on the positive aspects of European integration (see tables 6 and 7 below). Thus, reforming the EU has become more significant relative to the positive mentions of the EU. In this section we explain Labour and the Liberal DemocratsÕ cautious approach to Europe, which is best understood as soft Europhila. We account for external and internal explanatory variables. The external variables refer to the broader political environment in which the two parties operate, such as the media and voters, and to their status as parties in government or opposition. The internal explanatory variable refers to intra-party divisions on the EU that have put pressure on party leaderships.
The Limits of Europhilia
The UKÕs relationship with the EU is complex, and no other member state has negotiated as many opt-outs from core EU policies (such as the Euro or Schengen) as the UK. Yet, as Copsey and Haughton (2014) remind us, levels of public Euroscepticism are not overwhelmingly high in the UK, compared to some other member states. Rather, a great majority of British voters are ÔEU-agnosticÕ and change their EU views over time. This volatility makes it difficult for mainstream parties to hit the right tone. Furthermore, levels of EU knowledge are low amongst the British public (Oppermann and Brummer, 2013) . It is also common knowledge that news media can fuel public cynicism and scepticism about the EU (de Vreese, 2007) .
In the UK, the press Ôhave been forthright in their opposition towards the EU and its perceived threat to BritainÕs sovereigntyÕ (Usherwood and Startin, 2013: 10) . In this context, party leaders try to avoid harsh criticism from the largely Eurosceptic press. National party elites also respond to the party supportersÕ EU positions. At the same time, they also shape them. For example, Sanders and Toka (2013) 
Graph 1 about here
Graph 2 about here ! Furthermore, these two graphs also depict that Labour and Liberal Democrat supporters were very similar in their views on BritainÕs EU membership. This was mirrored by the two partiesÕ very similar policies on the EU membership referendum.
Yet, despite these similarities, the two parties have chosen different EU strategies.
Most importantly, Labour has sought to depoliticise or defuse EU issues for fear of losing votes since the beginning of the 2000s (Oppermann, 2008) Democrats had re-gained their confidence to speak out for the EU, as will be discussed below.
Being in government or opposition
In government, political parties tend to be more cautious not to clash over policies with their coalition partners, whilst in opposition, they can make bolder claims and promises. The Liberal Democrats managed to curtail the Conservative PartyÕs efforts to renegotiate the basis of BritainÕs membership of the EU in the 2010 coalition agreement (Oppermann and Brummer, 2013) . However, in government, the Liberal Democrats only played a junior role on foreign policy issues and only played a limited role in moderating Conservative Party policy behind the scenes. This drew criticism that the party was seeking to avoid talking in public about Europe for fear of destabilising the government (Daddow, 2012) . As Dommett (2013: 218) Still, overall, EU policy is not very salient amongst the British electorate (Clements et al., 2013) , and both the 2014 and 2015 election campaigns focused on issues other than the EU, such as health policy and public spending in general. Hence, speaking out for the EU is unlikely to have affected the Liberal DemocratsÕ vote shares.
The example of the Labour Party shows that even in opposition, mainstream party leaderships are careful not to come across as hard Europhiles. Under Ed Miliband, EU issues were kept at a very low profile. As a consequence, the party took time to decide on a referendum strategy and felt pressurised to offer a referendum, against its initial plans. This has been interpreted by some as an attempt to defuse differences between
Labour and the Liberal Democrats in order to retain the allegiance of Liberal
Democrat supporters who defected to Labour after the 2010 election (Financial Times, 12/03/2014 
Intra-Party divisions on EU issues
Last but not least, intra-party divisions on EU issues within the leadership, but also between the leadership and the broader party organization, emerged that made it more difficult for LabourÕs and the Liberal DemocratsÕ leaderships to send out a hard Europhile message. In the Labour Party, divisions have re-surfaced in recent years. (Webb and Bale 2015) .
Hence, in recent years, both LabourÕs and the Liberal DemocratsÕ leaderships had to manage a certain level of intra-party divisions on EU issues. This can explain, in part, why they avoided strongly Europhile statements in public when it could damage the cohesion of their parties.
Conclusions
The Labour Party and the Liberal Democrats have often been described as pro- For Labour, unlike some Conservatives, being pro-reform is not a proxy for being anti-Europe. Indeed, for Labour, the reform of Europe should not be seen as a question mark over our commitment to Britain's future within Europe. Instead it is not just the safest ground, but also the most solid foundation, on which a positive case about Britain's membership of the EU can be made -and the concerns of the public addressed. That is why Labour will continue to make the case for Britain's place in Europebut also for reform within Europe (Douglas Alexander, 16/02/2013).
The Liberal DemocratsÕ former leader, Nick Clegg, made a similar statement, arguing that Ôpro-Europeans are the real reformers nowÕ and that being Ôpro-European means being pro-reformÕ (Liberal Democrats, 09/05/2014). Thus, the two parties still perceived themselves as Europhiles.
Against the backdrop of the European UnionÕs continuing economic, financial, and legitimacy crisis, this reformist discourse is hardly surprising. In fact, most, if not all, mainstream parties in Europe started to call for EU reform after the outbreak of the Eurozone crisis. Yet, many of these parties called for more, not less, European integration. By contrast, Labour and the Liberal Democrats rarely made a positive, emotive case for the EU. They mainly praised the economic benefits of the EU, such as the membership of the single market of goods and services. Whether this rather sober message will be strong enough to convince the voters to vote in favour of staying in the EU in the upcoming referendum remains to be seen. At the least, given their strikingly similar EU policies, Labour and the Liberal Democrats could easily join forces during the EU referendum campaign.
